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Abstract
Agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to be able to reason about the effects
of their actions, and to gain further information about that world they need to use sensors of some
sort. Unfortunately, both the effects of actions and the information returned from sensors are subject
to error. To cope with such uncertainties, the agent can maintain probabilistic beliefs about the state
of the world. With probabilistic beliefs the agent will be able to quantify the likelihood of the various
outcomes of its actions and is better able to utilize the information gathered from its error-prone
actions and sensors. In this paper, we present a model in which we can reason about an agent’s
probabilistic degrees of belief and the manner in which these beliefs change as various actions are
executed. We build on a general logical theory of action developed by Reiter and others, formalized in
the situation calculus. We propose a simple axiomatization that captures an agent’s state of belief and
the manner in which these beliefs change when actions are executed. Our model displays a number
of intuitively reasonable properties. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
An intelligent agent interacting with a dynamic and incompletely known world faces
two special sorts of reasoning problems. First, because the world is dynamic, it will need
to reason about change: how its actions and the actions of others affect the state of the
world. For example, an agent will need to reason that if a fragile object is dropped then
it will probably break, and regardless of what else happens, the object will remain broken
until it is repaired. Second, because the world is incompletely known, the agent will need
to make do with partial descriptions of the state of the world. As a result, the agent will
often need to augment what it knows by performing perceptual actions, using sensors of
some sort. Unfortunately, both the effectors that the agent uses to modify the world and
the sensors it uses to sense the world will in practice be subject to uncertainty, i.e., they
will be noisy. For example, a robotic agent may not know initially how far away it is from
the nearest wall, but may have a sensor that it can use to obtain information about this
distance. Because the sensor is noisy, a reading of, say, “3.1 meters” does not guarantee
that the agent is actually 3.1 meters from the wall, although it should serve to increase the
agent’s degree of belief in that fact. It may need to read this sensor (or additional sensors) a
number of times to get a sufficiently reliable measurement. Similarly, if it attempts to move
0.7 meters towards the wall, it may well end up moving 0.8 meters due to inaccuracies in
its effectors. Nevertheless, its degree of belief that it is closer to the wall should increase.
In this paper, we propose a representational formalism to capture the reasoning required
to keep the agent’s beliefs about the world synchronized with the effects of the various
actions it performs. Without such a synchronization the agent would be unable to modify
its environment in any purposeful manner.
Somewhat surprisingly, although the importance of dealing with dynamic and incom-
pletely known worlds has long been argued within AI, very few adequate representation
formalisms have emerged. 3 We can classify existing ones into two broad camps. On the
one hand, we have probabilistic formalisms such as Bayesian nets [29] for dealing with
uncertainty in general, and the uncertainty that would arise from noisy sensors in particu-
lar. However, with the exceptions noted below, these probabilistic formalisms have not at-
tempted to incorporate a general model of action, i.e., representing what does and does not
change as the result of performing an action. In addition, while it is possible to express in
these formalisms probabilistic dependencies among variables, which are in essence atomic
propositions, it is not easy to deal with many other forms of incomplete knowledge. For
example, it is difficult to say that one of two conditions holds, or that all objects of a cer-
tain type have a certain property when it is not known what those objects are. Logical
formalisms, on the other hand, with features like disjunction and quantification, are well
suited for expressing incomplete knowledge of this type. Moreover, logical formalisms
like dynamic logics, process logics, or the situation calculus allow us to reason about the
prerequisites and effects of actions.
3 Besides representation formalisms there has also been work on planning under uncertainty (e.g., Kushmerick
et al. [17]) and sensing (e.g., Etzioni et al. [10]). Such work typically develops and utilizes representations that are
specifically tailored to support the planning algorithms being used. Hence, these representations are not general-
purpose mechanisms for representing an agent’s changing beliefs in the face of actions, as we are striving for
here.
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These observations suggest that it would be useful to have a formalism that allows us
to combine actions, knowledge, (probabilistic) beliefs, and first-order reasoning. There has
been work that puts some of these components together. For example, the frameworks of
Bacchus [1] and Halpern [13] combines first-order reasoning and probability, but this work
does not explicitly address reasoning about actions. The framework of Halpern and Tuttle
[15] has probability, knowledge, time, and actions, but it is not a first-order formalism.
The action network formalism of Darwiche and Goldszmidt [4] extends Bayesian nets to
allow probabilistic reasoning about action and observation sequences and their effects. 4
Most recently, Poole [33] has proposed a formalism that like ours addresses actions and
probabilities in the situation calculus. We discuss Poole’s work further in Section 8.
In this paper, we propose a framework that combines first-order reasoning, with reason-
ing about knowledge, probability, and actions. For reasoning about actions we start with
a variant of the situation calculus [27] that incorporates the solution to the frame problem
proposed by Reiter [34]. Building on this and on the work of Scherl and Levesque [36],
who incorporated knowledge and perceptual actions into the situation calculus, we show
how probabilities can be added and how the effects of actions on an agent’s probabilistic
beliefs can be modeled.
We base our work on the situation calculus as it has proved to be a very convenient
formalism for modeling actions, their prerequisites, and their effects, and for modeling
incomplete knowledge of the state of the world. Of course, our approach inherits these fea-
tures. In addition, it allows us to build on previous work done in this framework and to take
advantage of parallel developments. For example, although Reiter’s solution to the frame
problem is limited in a number of ways, it has been extended to handle aspects of the rami-
fication problem [24], goal achievability [23], continuous time [32], and perceptual actions
[36]. Another extension of the theory to deal with complex actions (sequence, iterations,
recursive procedures, nondeterminism, etc.), briefly described in Section 3, has led to a
novel logic programming language called GOLOG. GOLOG has proved to be useful for de-
scribing high-level robot and softbot control [21]. An implementation of GOLOG exists and
a number of programs (including a banking agent softbot application [20]) currently run in
simulation mode. A mail delivery application written in GOLOG also runs on two different
robot platforms [39]. We expect that the extensions we make here can be incorporated into
this framework as well.
Independently of the situation calculus, however, our formalism demonstrates an in-
teresting interaction between actions and differing mechanisms for updating probabilistic
beliefs. And as we hope to make clear from our presentation, much of what we do here
could be carried out in other logical frameworks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the
theory of action in terms of which our account is formulated: the situation calculus and
the solution to the frame problem proposed by Reiter. In Section 3, we examine how non-
deterministic actions can be handled within this framework. In Section 4, we augment the
4 Actions in the context of probabilistic networks appeared much earlier, e.g., in Howard and Matheson’s work
on influence diagrams [16]. This work was extended to accommodate full sequential decision models by Tatman
and Shachter [40]. Nevertheless, Darwiche and Goldszmidt’s model is much more closely related to the one we
present here. Specifically, it more clearly separates the actions executed by the agent and the successive belief
states the agent passes through as it learns the outcome of those actions.
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framework by adding the notion of the agent’s epistemic state. In Section 5 we show how
probabilities can be added, and present a simple formalization within the situation calculus
of the degree of belief an agent has in propositions expressed as logical formulas. This
allows us to formalize in more quantitative terms the changes in belief that arise when
dealing with noisy sensors and effectors. Examples of the formalism at work are presented
in Section 7, and some conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
2. A theory of action
Our account of sensors is formulated as a logical theory in an extended version of the
situation calculus. The situation calculus [27] is a many-sorted dialect of the predicate
calculus (with some second-order features), containing sorts for (among other things)
situations, which are like the possible worlds of modal logic, for primitive deterministic
actions, and, since we will be dealing with probabilities, for real numbers.
The situation calculus is specifically designed for representing dynamically changing
worlds. All changes to the world are the result of named actions. A possible world history,
which can be though of as the result of applying some sequence of actions to a fixed initial
situation, is represented by a first-order term called a situation. The constant S0 is used to
denote the initial situation. There is a distinguished binary function symbol do; do(α, s)
denotes the successor situation to s resulting from performing the action α. Actions may
be parameterized. For example, put(x, y) might stand for the action of putting object x
on object y , in which case do(put(A,B), s) denotes that situation resulting from placing
A on B when in situation s. Notice that in the situation calculus, actions are denoted by
first-order terms, and situations (world histories) are also first-order terms. For example,
do(putdown(A), do(walk(L), do(pickup(A),S0))) is a situation denoting the world history
consisting of the sequence of actions [pickup(A), walk(L), putdown(A)] executed in S0.
Relations whose truth values vary from situation to situation, called relational fluents,
are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their last argument. For exam-
ple, IsCarrying(robot,p, s), meaning that the robot is carrying package p in situation s, is
a relational fluent. Functions whose denotations vary from situation to situation are called
functional fluents. They are denoted by function symbols with an extra argument taking a
situation term, as in position(robot, s), i.e., the robot’s location in situation s. Finally, we
use the distinguished predicate POSS(a, s) to state that action a is possible to execute in
situation s.
2.1. Actions
Actions have preconditions—necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize when
the action is physically possible. For example, in a blocks world, we might have: 5
POSS(pickup(x), s)≡¬∃z.Holding(z, s)∧NextTo(x, s)∧¬Heavy(x),
5 In formulas, free variables are considered to be universally quantified. This convention will be followed
throughout the paper.
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which says that an object x can be picked up if and only if the agent is not currently holding
something, it is next to x , and x is not heavy.
Definition 2.1 (Precondition axioms). Precondition axioms are axioms of the form
POSS(a, s)≡ φ(a, s).
Here φ is a formula that specifies the necessary and sufficient properties of the situation s
and the action a, under which a can be executed in s.
The manner in which the actions modify the world are specified by their effect axioms.
These describe the effects of a given action on the fluents. For example, a robot dropping a
fragile object causes it to be broken:
POSS(drop(r, x), s)∧ Fragile(x, s)⊃ Broken(x,do(drop(r, x), s)). (1)
Exploding a bomb next to an object causes it to be broken:
POSS(explode(b), s)∧NextTo(b, x, s)⊃ Broken(x,do(explode(b), s)). (2)
A robot repairing an object causes it to be not broken:
POSS(repair(r, x), s)⊃¬Broken(x,do(repair(r, x), s)). (3)
2.2. The frame problem
As first observed by McCarthy and Hayes [27], axiomatizing a dynamic world requires
more than just action precondition and effect axioms. So-called frame axioms are also
necessary. These specify the action invariants of the domain, namely, those fluents that
remain unaffected by a given action. For example, an object’s colour is not affected by a
robot dropping something:
POSS(drop(r, x), s)∧ Colour(y, s)= c⊃ Colour(y,do(drop(r, x), s))= c.
A frame axiom describing how the fluent Broken is unaffected:
POSS(drop(r, x), s)∧¬Broken(y, s)∧ y 6= x ∨¬Fragile(y, s)
⊃¬Broken(y,do(drop(r, x), s)).
The problem introduced by the need for such frame axioms is that we can expect a
great many of them. Relatively few actions will affect the truth value of a given fluent; all
other actions leave the fluent unchanged. For example, an object’s colour is not changed
by picking things up, opening a door, going for a walk, electing a new prime minister of
Canada, etc. This is problematic for the axiomatizer who must think of all these axioms; it
is also problematic for any automated reasoning process as it must reason efficiently in the
presence of so many frame axioms.
Suppose that the person responsible for axiomatizing an application domain has
specified all of the causal laws for the world being axiomatized. More precisely, suppose
they have succeeded in writing down all the effect axioms, i.e., for each fluent F and each
action A that can cause F ’s truth value to change, they have written axioms of the form
POSS(A, s)∧R(Ex, s)⊃ (¬)F (Ex,do(A, s)),
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where R is a first-order formula specifying the contextual conditions under which the
action A will have its specified effect on F .
A reasonable solution to the frame problem would be a systematic procedure for
generating, from these effect axioms, all the frame axioms. If possible, we would also want
a parsimonious representation for these frame axioms (because in their simplest form, there
are too many of them).
2.3. A simple solution to the frame problem
By appealing to earlier ideas of Haas [12], Schubert [37], and Pednault [31], Reiter [34]
proposed a simple solution to the frame problem (and independently Elkan [9]), which we
employ in this work. It is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that Eqs. (1)–(3) are
all the effect axioms for the fluent Broken, i.e., they describe all the ways that any action
can change the truth value of Broken. We can rewrite (1) and (2) in the logically equivalent
form:
POSS(a, s)∧ ∃r. a = drop(r, x)∧ Fragile(x, s)
∨∃b. a = explode(b)∧ NextTo(b, x, s)
⊃ Broken(x,do(a, s)).
Similarly, consider the negative effect axiom for Broken, (3); this can be rewritten as:
POSS(a, s)∧ ∃r. a = repair(r, x)⊃¬Broken(x,do(a, s)).
In general, we can assume that the effect axioms for a fluent F have been written in the
forms:
POSS(a, s)∧ γ+F (Ex, a, s)⊃ F(Ex,do(a, s)), (4)
POSS(a, s)∧ γ−F (Ex, a, s)⊃¬F(Ex,do(a, s)). (5)
Here γ+F (Ex, a, s) is a formula describing the conditions under which doing the action
a in situation s causes the fluent F to become true in the successor situation do(a, s);
similarly γ−F (Ex, a, s) describes the conditions under which performing a in s causes F to
become false in the successor situation. Reiter’s solution to the frame problem rests on a
completeness assumption, which is that the causal axioms (4) and (5) characterize all the
conditions under which action a can lead to a fluent F(Ex) becoming true (respectively,
false) in the successor situation. In other words, axioms (4) and (5) describe all the causal
laws affecting the truth values of the fluent F . Therefore, if action a is possible and F(Ex)’s
truth value changes from false to true as a result of doing a, then γ+F (Ex, a, s) must be
true and similarly for a change from true to false. Reiter [34] shows how to automatically
derive a successor-state axiom from the causal axioms (4) and (5) and the completeness
assumption.
Definition 2.2 (Successor-state axioms). Successor-state axioms are axioms of the
following form
POSS(a, s)⊃ F(Ex,do(a, s))
≡ γ+F (Ex, a, s)∨ (F (Ex, s)∧¬γ−F (Ex, a, s))
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for relational fluents F , and of the form
POSS(a, s)⊃ f (Ex,do(a, s))= z
≡ γf (z, Ex, a, s),
for functional fluents f . These axioms characterize the state of a fluent F (or the value of a
functional fluent f ) in the successor situation given properties of the current state and the
action executed.
The successor-state axiom for F is a solution to the frame problem for that fluent. Notice
that this axiom universally quantifies over actions a. In fact, the ability to universally
quantify over actions is one of the keys to obtaining a parsimonious solution to the frame
problem.
Applying this to our example about breaking things, we obtain the following successor-
state axiom:
POSS(a, s)⊃ Broken(x,do(a, s))
≡ ∃r. a = drop(r, x)∧ Fragile(x, s)
∨∃b. a = explode(b)∧ NextTo(b, x, s)
∨Broken(x, s)∧¬∃r. a = repair(r, x).
It is important to note that the above solution to the frame problem presupposes that there
are no state constraints, as, for example, the blocks world constraint: ∀s.On(x, y, s) ⊃
¬On(y, x, s). Such constraints can implicitly contain effect axioms (so-called indirect
effects), in which case the above completeness assumption will not be true. The assumption
that there are no state constraints in the axiomatization of the domain will be made
throughout this paper. 6
In general, for any application, we use what is called in [24] a basic action theory
consisting of the following axioms:
• axioms describing the initial situation—what is true initially, before any actions have
occurred. This is any finite set of sentences that mention only the situation term S0;
• action-precondition axioms (Definition 2.1), one for each primitive action;
• successor-state axioms (Definition 2.2), one for each fluent;
• unique-name axioms for the primitive actions (saying that primitive actions with
distinct names are different);
• a set of domain-independent foundational axioms for the situation calculus [24].
These are used to state that the situations are all and only those reachable from S0
by performing a finite sequence of actions.
6 In [24], the approach discussed in this section is extended to deal with some forms of state constraints, by
compiling their effects into the successor-state axioms.
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3. Nondeterministic actions
In the description of the situation calculus in the previous section, actions are taken to be
deterministic in the sense that it is assumed that there exists a unique successor state for any
action executed. To model noisy sensors and effectors, we first show how nondeterministic
actions can be handled within this framework without giving up the simple solution to the
frame problem outlined above.
Nondeterministic actions are treated as being the actual execution of one of a range
of primitive (deterministic) actions. Nondeterminism arises from the fact that we do not
know exactly which primitive action was actually executed. Thus, when a nondeterministic
action is executed by the agent, the current situation will have a set of successor states, one
successor state for each possible primitive action. Nevertheless, we retain the property
that each of the underlying primitive actions yields a unique successor state. Hence, the
solution to the frame problem above can be applied to each of these states individually, and
any properties than can be shown to hold of every successor state will then be provable
consequences of the nondeterministic action.
The idea can be illustrated by imagining a simple robot that can move along an
unbounded one-dimensional surface. In the deterministic case, we might have a functional
fluent position(s) and an action exact-advance(x) that changes the position of the robot by
some amount x . We could then write the following successor-state axiom for position:
POSS(a, s)⊃ position(do(a, s))=
if ∃x. a = exact-advance(x)
then position(s)+ x
else position(s),
(6)
assuming that exact-advance is the only action affecting position. 7
The action exact-advance is deterministic—executing it yields a unique successor state.
Suppose instead we want to model a nondeterministic action noisy-advance(x), which
results in the agent moving a distance y which is approximately equal to x . Since we
only allow deterministic primitive actions in our framework, we view noisy-advance(x) as
the union of all the possible moves that the agent could actually make, given that it tries to
move x . To capture this, we assume that the language contains primitive actions of the form
advance(x, y), where x is the nominal distance the agent is trying to move, by sending an
appropriate command to its on-board effectors, while y is the actual distance moved. The
agent has control over the nominal distance, but no direct control over the actual distance
moved. So, in fact, the agent cannot execute an instance of advance(x, y) directly.
7 We are taking some liberties here with notation and the scope of variables; the if-then-else formula should be
viewed as an abbreviation for the formula
POSS(a, s)⊃ position(do(a, s))= z
≡ ∃x.a = exact-advance(x)∧ z= position(s)+ x
∨¬∃x.a = exact-advance(x)∧ z= position(s).
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Nevertheless, we can write a successor-state axiom for position assuming that it can
be changed only by the action advance. The axiom is the same as above except that the
position is changed by the actual distance moved and the nominal distance is ignored.
POSS(a, s)⊃ position(do(a, s))=
if ∃x, y. a = advance(x, y)
then position(s)+ y
else position(s).
(7)
Although the agent cannot execute an instance of advance directly, it can activate
its effectors specifying a particular nominal value for the distance to be moved. This
corresponds to executing a nondeterministic action: execute advance(x, y) for a fixed value
of x and a nondeterministic choice of y .
To specify the execution of such actions we need to expand our notation for do to
allow for more than one potential successor state. 8 The first step is to allow more
complex actions. Starting with primitive actions (the ones which already have names
in the language), we form more complex actions by closing off under sequencing and
nondeterministic choice. In particular, if δ1 and δ2 are actions, then so are δ1; δ2 (intuitively,
perform δ1 and then δ2), δ1|δ2 (intuitively, nondeterministically choose one of δ1 and δ2 and
perform it), and pix.δ1 (intuitively, perform δ1 for some nondeterministically chosen value
of x; this is particularly interesting if x is a free variable in δ1). Given a (complex) action δ,
we follow the approach taken in GOLOG [21] and define Do(δ, s, s+) as an abbreviation for
a situation calculus formula which intuitively reads “s+ is a possible final situation arising
from the execution of action δ in situation s”. Do is defined by the following recursive
expansions:
(1) If δ is a primitive action like exact-advance(x) or advance(x, y), then the expansion
of Do(δ, s, s+) is:
Do(a, s, s+) def= POSS(a, s)∧ s+ = do(a, s).
(2) If δ is of the form δ1 ; δ2, then the expansion is
Do([δ1 ; δ2], s, s+) def= ∃s′.Do(δ1, s, s′)∧Do(δ2, s′, s+).
(3) If δ is of the form δ1|δ2, then the expansion is
Do(δ1|δ2, s, s+) def= Do(δ1, s, s+)∨Do(δ2, s, s+).
(4) If δ is of the form pix.δ1, then the expansion is
Do([pix.δ1], s, s+) def= ∃x.Do(δ1, s, s+).
This expansion allows for a different successor state for each value of x .
8 Remember that do(. . .) is defined to be a first-order term. Hence, it can denote only a single individual, in this
case a single situation.
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Now we can formalize a nondeterministic move action noisy-advance(x) that is directly
executable by the agent:
noisy-advance(x) def= piy.advance(x, y). (8)
In this form, noisy-advance does not give the agent any control over its movements
since we have not specified any relationship between the nominal value x asked for and
the actual value y achieved. One constraint between these two values might be to assert that
there is an absolute bound on the effector’s error. That is, there is a bound on the difference
between the value asked for and the value achieved. This can be captured by asserting the
following precondition axiom for advance:
POSS(advance(x, y), s)≡ |x − y|6 b, (9)
where b is the magnitude of the maximum possible error. This axiom says that it is
impossible to execute advance actions in which the actual value moved is more that b units
different from the value asked for. When this precondition is combined with the definition
of the nondeterministic action noisy-advance, it limits the choice of advance actions that
can arise. Combining this precondition axiom, the definition of noisy-advance, and the
expansions for Do, it is not difficult to see that the action noisy-advance(x) can never yield
a successor state in which the agent has moved an amount outside the range [x− b, x+ b].
More formally we have as a direct entailment that
Do(noisy-advance(x), s, s+)⊃ |position(s+)− position(s)− x|6 b.
In Section 5, we demonstrate how a probabilistic relationship can be specified between the
nominal and actual values so as to capture the fact that these two values are correlated—
although the agent’s actions do not always have exactly their intended effect they do have
an effect that is correlated with what was intended.
Finally, it should be noted that we have added nothing to the previous situation calculus
story except a few convenient abbreviations. Since the execution of any complex action
ultimately reduces to the execution of some collection of deterministic actions, we can
apply the previous solution to the frame problem to each of the possible final situations.
4. Adding knowledge
When the agent executes a nondeterministic action like the noisy-advance action
described above, the particular deterministic action that ends up being executed remains
unknown to the agent. Hence, it is clear that in the presence of such actions (and in the
presence of perceptual actions) there needs to be a distinction between the state of the
world and the information the agent has about the state of the world. We would like to
be able to talk about the effect of actions like advance on what an agent or robot knows
or believes about where it is located. For example, doing a noisy-advance decreases the
robot’s certainty about its position, but doing a sensing action increases it (in a manner to
be described below). To accomplish this, we need to be able to characterize and reason
about the agent’s knowledge and beliefs about the world, i.e., the agent’s epistemic state,
and to distinguish this from the actual state of the world.
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4.1. Observation indistinguishability
To talk about the actual state of the world in the situation calculus is easy: the current
situation captures the current state of the world. To capture the agent’s epistemic state we
employ some standard ideas from modal logics of knowledge and belief. (See [11] for an
introduction, and Section 7.2 for a discussion of how the approach taken here relates to
the model of knowledge presented there.) In modal logic, an agent has a binary possibility
relation or accessibility relation on possible worlds. The agent is then said to know a fact
φ in world (or situation) s if φ is true at all the worlds the agent considers possible, as
captured by the possibility relation. It is well known that various properties of knowledge
can be captured by placing constraints on the possibility relation. In particular, if we take
the possibility relation to be transitive and Euclidean, the agent has positive and negative
introspection, so it knows what it knows and knows what it does not know.
These ideas were first applied in the context of the situation calculus by Moore [28],
who introduced a binary fluent K into the language to capture the possibility relation of
modal logic. That is, K(s′, s) holds if, in situation s, the agent considers situation s′ to be
possible. As in modal logic, we say that the agent knows φ in situation s if φ(s′) holds
in all situations s′ that the agent considers possible in s (i.e., such that K(s′, s) holds).
Moore’s approach was extended and integrated with Reiter’s solution to the frame problem
by Scherl and Levesque [36]. The key issue is defining an appropriate successor-state
axiom forK , that specifies how the fluent changes after doing an action a in some situation
s. In other words, we need to specify what has to be true of s′+ forK(s′+,do(a, s)) to hold.
Scherl and Levesque do this by specifying which actions change the K fluent. However,
their specification requires that the agent always comes to know what action was executed.
We need to model the case where nondeterministic actions are being executed by the agent.
In particular, the agent cannot know the precise action chosen. For example, if the action
happens to be advance(x, y), we cannot expect the agent to know that this. Such knowl-
edge would mean that the agent knows exactly the distance y moved. Rather, we expect
the agent to know only the nominal value x that it tried to move (and whatever constraints
this places on y). That is, as a result of performing this action the agent learns only that it
tried to move x .
Another way of thinking about this is that, after doing advance(x, y), the agent knows
only that advance(x, y ′) was performed for some compatible value y ′. To formalize
this idea, we use a special predicate OI(a, a′, s), meaning a and a′ are observationally
indistinguishable, i.e., cannot be distinguished by the agent. We assume that as part of
the background theory, the user specifies a collection of observation-indistinguishability
axioms characterizing this predicate.
Definition 4.1 (Observation-indistinguishability axioms). Observation-indistinguishabi-
lity axioms are axioms of the form
OI(a, a′, s)≡ φ(a, a′, s),
one for each action a. Here φ is a formula that characterizes the relationship between
actions a and a′ that makes them indistinguishable in situation s. These axioms specify the
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set of actions a′ that the agent has no ability to discriminate from action a in situation s.
That is, in situation s the agent cannot tell if action a or a′ was executed.
For ordinary actions, i.e., primitive actions for which the agent knows when they are
performed and knows all of their consequences, this axiom would say that OI holds iff
a = a′. For example, if pickup(x) is an ordinary action, we would have
OI(pickup(x), a′, s)≡ a′ = pickup(x).
For actions like advance(x, y), however, the axiom would be
OI(advance(x, y), a′, s)≡ ∃y ′. a′ = advance(x, y ′). (10)
This says that, for example, the agent cannot distinguish between the executions of the
actions advance(3.0,3.2) and advance(3.0,2.8), since both involve attempting to move
the same 3.0 units.
Using OI, we can specify a new successor-state axiom for K that correctly handles
actions like advance(x, y).
Definition 4.2 (K’s successor-state axiom).
POSS(a, s)⊃K(s′+,do(a, s))
≡ ∃a′, s′. s′+ = do(a′, s′)∧ POSS(a′, s′)∧OI(a, a′, s)∧K(s′, s).
This axiom says that when the agent is in situation do(a, s) (after having executed action
a in situation s), the set of K-related situations (that define its state of knowledge) are pre-
cisely those situations that are the result of executing an observationally indistinguishable
action a′ from some situation s′ that satisfies the preconditions of a′ and was K-related to
the previous situation s. Intuitively, when the agent is in s, as far as it knows it could be
in any situation s′ that is K-related to s. Hence, as far as it knows it could have executed
a in any of these situations, and all of the a successors of these situations must be in its
new knowledge set. Moreover, it does not even know if it in fact executed a; it could have
executed any a′ indistinguishable from a, so the a′ successors of these situations must also
be in its new knowledge set. However, it does know that an action indistinguishable from
a was successfully executed. Hence, it can eliminate from its knowledge set the successors
of those situations that fail to satisfy the preconditions of some a′. It is not hard to show
that for ordinary actions like pickup(x), which are observationally indistinguishable only
from themselves, this axiom reduces to the axiom given by Scherl and Levesque [36]. 9
As we said earlier, we define knowledge to be truth in all worlds the agent considers
possible. For example, to say that the agent knows in situation s that object x is not
broken, we would state ∀s′.K(s′, s)⊃¬Broken(x, s′). It is convenient to introduce special
syntactic machinery to express this condition:
Definition 4.3 (KNOW). Let snow be a special situation term. We write KNOW(φ[snow], s)
to indicate that the agent knows φ[snow] in situation s. Thus, KNOW(φ[snow], s) is an
9 See Section 7.1 for how this axiom also correctly handles Scherl and Levesque’s knowledge producing
actions.
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abbreviation for the formula ∀s′.K(s′, s) ⊃ φ[snow/s′], where s′ is some variable not
appearing anywhere in φ, and φ[snow/s′] is the result of replacing all free 10 occurrences
of snow in φ by s′.
For example, KNOW(¬Broken(x, snow), s) is an abbreviation for the above formula. No-
tationally, it is often convenient to suppress the snow term and simply write KNOW(¬Broken
(x), s), assuming that it will be clear from context where the implicit situation variable s′
needs to be inserted. This abbreviation makes it obvious that knowledge is a function of
the current situation, i.e., the situation the agent is in. Of course, the agent may not know
precisely what situation it is in (it cannot distinguish the current situation from any other
situation K related to it). Nevertheless, the current situation (and the actions executed to
generate it) determines the agent’s state of knowledge.
Example 4.1. Given the axioms above, it is easy to show that after doing a noisy-
advance(x), the agent will know that its current position is its previous position plus x ,
give or take b units. More precisely, let us assume that we have a special function prev(s)
which for situations other than S0 denotes the situation immediately before s. 11 Then
these formulas entail
Do(noisy-advance(x), s, s+)
⊃ KNOW(position(snow) ∈ [position(prev(snow))+ x − b,
position(prev(snow))+ x + b], s+)
or, in more detail,
Do(noisy-advance(x), s, s+)
⊃ ∀s′+.K(s′+, s+)⊃ ∃a′, s′. s′+ = do(a′, s′)
∧ (position(s′)+ x − b)6 position(s′+)6 (position(s′)+ x + b).
Briefly, any situation s+ that is the result of executing noisy-advance(x) must have
been the result of executing advance(x, y) for some y . According to (9), advance(x, y)
is executable only if |x − y|6 b. Hence, from (7) we know that in s+, the agent’s position
is within b of its position at s plus x . By Definition 4.2 and (10), this holds in all of the
situations that are K-related to s+ as well: all of these situations are also the result of
executing advance(x, y) for some y with |x − y|6 b. Hence, the agent knows this in s+.
It is not hard to show that the agent would also know that this property holds before
executing the noisy-advance(x) action, that is, that the formula KNOW(ψ, s) is entailed,
where ψ is
∀s+.Do(noisy-advance(x), snow, s+)
⊃ position(s+) ∈ [position(snow)+ x − b,position(snow)+ x + b].
Observe that a noisy advance decreases positional certainty, in that even if the agent
knows its current position precisely, after doing a noisy advance it will know its position
10 An occurrence of snow is considered to be bound if it appears within the scope of KNOW and free otherwise.
11 We can characterize this function by the axiom prev(do(a, s))= s .
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only to within b units. Similarly, if the agent knows its current position to within a units it
will know its position only to within b+ a units after doing a noisy advance. In particular,
multiple advances add to the agent’s uncertainty, so the following formula is also entailed.
Do(noisy-advance(x) ; noisy-advance(y), s, s+)
⊃ KNOW(position(s+) ∈ [position(prev(prev(snow)))+ x + y − 2b,
position(prev(prev(snow)))+ x + y + 2b], s+).
4.2. Sensing actions
Sensing actions can also be handled within the account we have developed so far.
Sensing actions are actions that are executed primarily for the change they produce on
the K fluent; pure sensing actions would affect no other fluent, and would appear only in
the successor-state axiom of the K fluent.
For example, imagine that the robot has a sensor that senses its current location in our
one-dimensional world. The sensor is subject to error, so the value it returns is unlikely
to be the exact location. We can model the act of using such a sensor with an action
sense-position(x, y) that, like advance(x, y), contains both a nominal value x and an
actual value y . In this case, the nominal value x would be the value appearing on the sensor
when the sensing action is executed, and the actual value y would be the true position. As
with advance, we assume that the agent cannot observe the actual value. This gives the
following observation-indistinguishability axiom for sense-position:
OI(sense-position(x, y), a′, s)≡ ∃y ′. a′ = sense-position(x, y ′). (11)
What makes sense-position(x, y) carry information is the fact that the true position y
places constraints on the value of x that can be read from the sensor. This is captured by
the precondition axiom for this action, which is
POSS(sense-position(x, y), s)≡ y = position(s)∧ |x − y|6 c. (12)
In this case, we have simply asserted that there is a bound on the error in the value read
from the sensor: it must be within c units of the true value.
The main difference between sense-position and advance is that with sense-position the
robot does not have the ability to select either the nominal value read x or the actual value y .
The first of these is chosen nondeterministically, and depends on the error in that activation
of the sensor; the second (by virtue of the above precondition axiom) is determined by
the actual position of the robot. Thus, we assume that the robot merely gets to execute the
nondeterministic action noisy-sense-position which takes no arguments:
noisy-sense-position def= pix,y. sense-position(x, y). (13)
Example 4.2. Given the axioms above, we can show that after doing a noisy-sense-
position, the agent will know what its current position is to within c units. More precisely,
Do(noisy-sense-position, s, s+)
⊃ ∃x.KNOW(position ∈ [x − c, x + c], s+),
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or, in more detail,
∃x∃y s+ = do(sense-position(x, y), s)
⊃ ∃x∀s′+.K(s′+, s+)⊃ (x − c)6 position(s′+)6 (x + c)
is entailed by these axioms.
Once again, any situation s+ that can arise from executing noisy-sense-position must
be the result of executing a particular instance of sense-position(x, y). According to
(12), these instances are executable only if y = position(s) and x ∈ [position(s) −
c,position(s) + c]. Hence, there is a fixed value x (the value that will be read from
the sensor) such that position(s) ∈ [x − c, x + c]. Furthermore, by (7) we see that
sense-position actions do not affect the current position, so position(s+) = position(s)
and the bound holds in s+ as well.
Now if we examine all situations s′+ K-related to s+ we see that (1) they must be the re-
sult of executing an observationally indistinguishable action sense-position(x ′, y ′) in a sit-
uation s′ that is K-related to s, which by (11) means x ′ = x , and (2) sense-position(x ′, y ′)
must be possible in s′, which by (12) means y ′ = position(s′) and y ′ ∈ [x ′ − c, x ′ + c].
Putting these together we see that position(s′) ∈ [x − c, x + c]. Furthermore, again by (7),
we obtain position(s′+) ∈ [x − c, x + c]. Hence, the position in every K-related state lies
in a fixed range, so the agent must know this.
There are a couple of points worth noting. First, if the agent has very incomplete
knowledge of its position, then its knowledge of its position will increase after reading its
sensor. This increase of knowledge arises from the pruning away of K-related situations
that have divergent values of position. In particular, in situations with extreme values of
position there will be no observationally indistinguishable action sense-position(x, y ′) that
can be executed (the fact that y ′ must equal the situation’s position value will violate the
bound between y ′ and the fixed value of x).
Second, if the agent has strong knowledge of its position, then that knowledge will
not degrade after reading its sensor. For example, suppose that the agent knows the exact
value of its current position. This means that position has the same value in all situations
K-related to the current situation. In this case, the agent will continue to know its exact
position after reading its sensor. This arises from the fact that all situations that are
K-related to the successor state must arise from the execution of a sense-position action
in a situation that was K-related to the current state. Since, sense-position actions do not
change the value of position, they will all continue to share the same value of position.
5. Likelihood and degree of belief
Asserting bounds on the difference between the nominal values and the actual values
in actions like sense-position(x, y) represents a rather weak model of action uncertainty.
Suppose, for example, we have a sensor with an error bound of c = 2, and we make a
number of readings of a particular fluent using the sensor, all of which are clustered around
the value 3. For concreteness, suppose they are all between 2.8 and 3.1. As far as knowledge
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goes, all the agent will be able to conclude is that it knows the fluent to have a value in the
range [1.1, 4.8]. Getting numerous readings of 3 will not change this knowledge. Yet, even
if the agent is using a cheap sensor, we might hope that getting many such readings would
increase the agent’s degree of belief that the true value of the fluent is indeed close to 3.
To formalize these intuitions, we first quantify the notion of possibility (as captured by
theK fluent) by associating with each world the agent considers possible the agent’s degree
of belief that that is the actual world. We can think of this degree of belief as a subjective
probability. We then consider how these degrees of belief change over time, as a result of
actions being performed.
Degrees of belief
It is convenient to capture degree of belief by first associating with each situation a
weight, and then taking the degree of belief to be the normalized weight (since, like
probability, we want the degree of belief in the whole space to be 1). We capture the weight
by using a new functional fluent p(s′, s), analogous to K(s′, s). This function denotes the
relative weight given to situation s′ by the agent when it is in situation s.
We expect weights to be nonnegative and that all situations considered impossible will
be given weight 0. The following constraint, which we assume is part of the background
action theory, ensures that this is indeed the case initially:
∀s. p(s, S0)> 0∧
(¬K(s,S0)⊃ p(s, S0)= 0). (14)
As we shall see, the successor-state axiom for p ensures that these constraints hold at all
times.
We take the agent’s degree of belief in φ to be the total weight of all the worlds he
considers possible where φ holds, normalized by the total weight of all worlds he considers
possible. Thus, we are restricting ourselves to discrete probability distributions here, where
the probability of a set can be computed as the sum of the probabilities of the elements of
the set. 12 We introduce special notation for this, just as we did for KNOW.
Definition 5.1 (BEL). Let snow be a special situation term. We write BEL(φ[snow], s)
to denote the agent’s degree of belief in φ[snow] when it is in situation s. This is an
abbreviation for the term∑
{s ′: φ[snow/s ′]}p(s
′, s)
/∑
s ′
p(s′, s).
As with KNOW, we sometimes suppress the snow terms. In Appendix A, we show how the
summations in this formula can be expressed using second-order quantification. A logical
consequence of this formalization is that BEL(·, s) is a probability distribution over the
situations K-related to s.
12 This is in contrast to continuous probability distributions, in which the probability of each point is 0, so
the probability of a set cannot be computed as the sum of the probabilities of the elements in the set. Instead
integration over sets must be used. To avoid the messy, and purely technical, complications that would arise from
this, we make do with discrete probabilities. As we will see, discrete probabilities can be applied even in cases
where it would seem that we require continuous probability distributions.
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Action-likelihood functions
Next we have to define a successor-state axiom for the p fluent, that is, we need to
consider how the agent’s probability distribution changes over time. It will not be necessary
to characterize how belief changes, since belief is defined in terms of p.
Suppose the agent performs an action a in some situation s. If a is an ordinary
deterministic action like pickup(x), then the agent knows it will end up in a unique situation
do(pickup(x), s). Intuitively, in this case, the probability that it ascribed to s will be
transferred to do(pickup(x), s). Similarly, this is true for all the situations that the agent
considers possible at s.
But suppose that a is an action like sense-position(x, y): sensing a value of x
when the true position is y . In this case, the probability the agent ascribes to do(a, s)
will not simply be what is transferred from s; how likely the action a is must
also be taken into account. As discussed above, sense-position(x, y) is not an action
that an agent can execute directly: it executes something like noisy-sense-position,
and one of the sense-position actions is selected nondeterministically. But some of
these are more likely to be selected than others. For example, if the true position
in situation s is 3.0, we expect that sense-position(3.0,3.0) is far more likely to be
executed than sense-position(30.0,3.0). Consequently, the probability the agent ascribes
to the situation do(sense-position(3.0,3.0), s) should be greater than what it ascribes to
do(sense-position(30.0,3.0), s).
To specify these probabilities, we use what we call an action-likelihood function. We
add a special function `(a, s) to our language, used to denote the probability (assigned by
the agent in situation s) of primitive action a being selected among all its possible observa-
tionally indistinguishable alternatives. Thus, for example, `(sense-position(3.1,3.0), s) is
the likelihood that the agent would sense 3.1 when its true position was 3.0 in situation s.
Note that if a is an ordinary deterministic action like pickup(x), then its only observation-
ally indistinguishable alternative is a itself, so, as long as a is possible in s, we would
normally have `(a, s)= 1.
The error profile of the various effectors and sensors available to the agent is clearly
application dependent, and it is this error profile that is captured by the `(a, s) function.
Hence, we assume that the user specifies a collection of axioms characterizing ` for each
action a.
Definition 5.2 (Action-likelihood axioms). Action-likelihood axioms are axioms of the
form
`(a, s)= z≡ φ(a, s).
Here φ(a, s) is a formula that characterizes the conditions under which action a has
likelihood z in situation s. We will see some example axioms below.
With this machinery, we can give the successor-state axiom for p, and hence characterize
how belief changes as the result of performing an action. Suppose situation s′+ is of the
form do(a′, s′), that is, it is the result of doing action a′ in situation s′. Then the weight
that the agent assigns to s′+ in do(a, s) is the product of the weight it assigns to being
in situation s′ and the likelihood of a′ having been performed: the former is 0 unless
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K(s′, s) holds, in which case it is p(s′, s); the latter is 0 unless a′ is observationally
indistinguishable from a and possible in situation s′, in which case it is `(a′, s′).
Definition 5.3 (Successor-state axiom for p). The successor-state axiom for p is
POSS(a, s)⊃ p(s′+,do(a, s))=
if ∃a′, s′. s′+ = do(a′, s′)∧ POSS(a′, s′)∧ OI(a, a′, s)
then p(s′, s)× `(a′, s′)
else 0.
Note that the axiom captures the fact that any situation that is not K-related to the
successor state will be assigned probability 0: the precondition to the then clause is
precisely the condition required for a situation to be K related to the successor state
(Definition 4.2). It also ensures that when POSS(a′, s′) is false, the weight assigned to
the situation do(a′, s′) will be 0. 13
As a concrete example of how action-likelihood axioms can be used, consider an effector
action like advance(x, y), where the agent chooses the nominal value x and the actual value
y is nondeterministic. Suppose the correlation between x and y is described by a linear
Gaussian model: the actual value y is the nominal value x plus some random noise that has
a normal distribution. This means that y − x , the difference between the actual movement
and the nominal movement, is normally distributed, with some mean µ and variance σ 2.
If we further assume that the effector is calibrated so that there is no systematic bias,
then µ = 0, and the distribution of y − x is characterized by Normal((y − x)/σ), where
Normal(z) is the standardized normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. 14
Given these assumptions, the following axiom describes the action:
`(advance(x, y), s)= Normal((y − x)/σ). (15)
This axiom captures the linear Gaussian error model, asserting that the probability of the
effector moving y units when asked to move x units falls off like the normal distribution as
the difference between these two values increases. We can do something similar for sensor
actions. If x is the value read and y is the actual value, we might once again assume that
their difference x − y is normally distributed, say with variance σ ′2 and mean 0. (Again,
13 This can also be achieved by eliminating POSS from this axiom and requiring `(a′, s′) to be 0 when
POSS(a′, s′) is false.
14 There is a slight subtlety here. The normal distribution is, of course, a continuous distribution, so the
probability of a single real number is always zero. Only nontrivial intervals of the real line have positive
probability. We are assuming that all probability functions are discrete here, so we really need to consider an
approximation to the normal distribution. In examples like this, we can do so by treating action parameters as
finite precision numbers. In this case, we interpret Normal(z) as being the integral of the normal density function
over the range of precision of z. For example, if the actuator allows the agent to ask for only movements like
3.1 with 2 digits of precision, the range denoted by 3.1 could be 3.05–3.15, and Normal(3.1) would be the value
of the integral of the normal density function over this range. Given some fixed precision, a table of values for
Normal can be computed and added to the domain theory as a set of equations. From here on in, when we write
Normal, we actually mean the discrete probability distribution that approximates Normal.
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assuming a mean of 0 implies that there is no systematic bias in the reading.) This gives us
the following action-likelihood axiom:
`(sense-position(x, y), s)=
Normal((y − x)/σ ′) if position(s)= y,0 if position(s) 6= y. (16)
In either case, we could have also insisted that `(a, s) be 0 when POSS(a, s) is false (for
example, when the difference between the nominal and actual value exceeds some bound),
but as noted above, this is not necessary because of the way we have written the successor-
state axiom for p.
Example 5.1. When specifying the likelihood function we can encode complex context-
dependent error profiles. Suppose have a fluent slippery that is true of situations where the
robot is located on a slippery surface. We can account for a context-dependent effect on
the robot’s motion effectors with an axiom like
`(advance(x, y), s)=
if slippery(s)
then Normal((x − y)/2.4)
else Normal((x − y)/0.5)
which indicates that the probability of error increases significantly when the surface is
slippery (the standard deviation increases).
Similarly, suppose that the effector’s error is cumulative. That is, the further the robot
moves the greater the error. Then an action-likelihood axiom like the following can be
used:
`(advance(x, y), s)= Normal((x − y)/(cx)).
This axiom specifies that the standard deviation is some factor, c, of the nominal distance
the agent is attempting to move.
6. Summary of the formalization
This concludes the formal details of our approach. But before looking at some its
properties, let us summarize the components. To incorporate noisy sensors and effectors as
well as degrees of belief into the situation calculus, we started with the standard situation
calculus and added two additional fluents, K and p, a new distinguished predicate OI, and
a function `. We needed to extend the basic theory of action (see Section 2.3) to what we
will now call an extended theory of action, consisting of the following axioms:
• axioms describing the initial situation, as before, but now including Axiom 14 for K
and p in S0;
• action-precondition axioms, as before;
• successor-state axioms, as before, but now including one for K (Definition 4.2) and
one for p (Definition 5.3);
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• unique-name axioms for the primitive actions, as before;
• observation-indistinguishability axioms (Definition 4.1) characterizing OI, one for
each action;
• action-likelihood axioms (Definition 5.2) characterizing `, one for each action;
• various abbreviations for convenience, including KNOW, BEL, and Do (to specify
complex actions);
• axioms (given in Appendix A) to ensure that BEL is always a probability distribution;
• the foundational domain-independent axioms. These need to be modified to take into
account that because of its epistemic alternatives, S0 is no longer the only initial
situation [19]. However, nothing we do here hinges on these details.
As we shall show, all of the expected properties are then logical consequences of these
axioms. In taking this approach, we obtain the full expressiveness of the situation calculus
for reasoning about action, a simple solution to the frame problem, as well as an expressive
language for dealing with the uncertainty arising from sensors and effectors.
7. The formalism at work
We have presented a particular model for noisy actions and their effects on an agent’s
beliefs. Our model involves using nondeterministic actions with probabilities attached to
the various nondeterministic choices. This gives a model of actions that is essentially
identical to standard probabilistic actions, where an action yields various successor states
with varying probabilities. Although this is a fairly standard model, it is difficult to defend
its correctness in any formal way. The best that can be done is to demonstrate that the
model behaves in a way that matches our intuitions and properly replicates other more
specialized approaches.
7.1. Knowledge-producing actions
In the Scherl and Levesque approach, in addition to ordinary actions like pickup(x), there
are assumed to be special knowledge-producing action associated with various fluents.
For example, to open a safe by dialing its combination, an agent needs to know what the
combination is. If the combination of the safe is written on a piece of paper, there might
be a knowledge-producing action read-combi whose effect is to change the the state of
knowledge to make the value of the combi fluent known.
We can model this type of action as follows. Assume we have a primitive action read(z)
which is the action of reading the number z on the piece of paper. We assume that
this action only happens if z is the combination of the safe, which we model using a
precondition axiom.
POSS(read(z), s)≡ z= combi(s).
In this case, there is no distinction between the number observed on the paper and the
actual value, and so this action is observationally indistinguishable only from itself:
OI(read(z), a, s)≡ a = read(z).
F. Bacchus et al. / Artificial Intelligence 111 (1999) 171–208 191
Finally, the agent cannot choose which number to see, it can only choose whether or not to
see what is written on the paper. Consequently, we define read-combi by
read-combi def= piz. read(z).
It is then easy to show, that after reading what is on the paper, the agent knows the
combination to the safe. That is, the following is entailed:
Do(read-combi, s, s+)⊃ ∃z.KNOW(z= combi, s+).
This approach clearly generalizes to handling knowledge-producing actions which tell the
agent the truth value of some fluent. One nice advantage of the approach here is that, unlike
in Scherl and Levesque, it is not necessary to mention by name the knowledge-producing
actions in the successor-state axiom for K , which means that it is not necessary to know
them all in advance.
7.2. The FHMV model of knowledge
To further understand our approach to modeling the agent’s knowledge and belief in the
situation calculus, it is useful to compare it with the approach to modeling multi-agent
systems taken in [11,14] by Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi (FHMV) (and expanded in
[15] to allow probabilistic actions). In this approach, agents are always assumed to be in
some local state. Besides the agents, there is an environment, which at any given time is
also in a particular state. The environment’s state captures everything that is relevant to the
description of the system and not captured by the agent’s state. Thus, if there is only one
agent (as is the case here), the system’s global state at any time can be described by a pair
(se, sa), where se is the environment’s state and sa is the agent’s state. The system’s global
state changes as a result of actions being performed. These actions may change either (or
both) of the components of the global state. For example, a sensing action that did not
change the environment could be modeled as changing only the agent component sa of the
global state.
What we are doing here using the situation calculus can be modeled within this
framework by mapping situations to global states. That is, we map every situation s to
a pair (se, sa). This mapping can be constructed in a variety of ways. Perhaps the easiest is
to take se, the environment’s state, to consist of the values of the fluents (other than do, K ,
and p) in S0, together with the sequence of primitive actions used to generate the situation.
Similarly, the agent’s state, sa , can consist of an initial state that describes the agent’s
beliefs in S0, together with a sequence that records what the agent learns as a result of
performing the actions described in the corresponding environment state. In our approach,
the agent learns only that an observationally indistinguishable action was executed; so an
appropriate sequence for the agent state can be generated by replacing each action a in
the corresponding environment sequence by a unique canonical representative from the set
of actions that are observationally indistinguishable to a (with respect to the situation that
a was executed in). We remark that Lakemeyer independently used this approach to give
semantics to knowledge and only knowing in the situation calculus [18] (also see [19]).
This method of mapping situations to global states captures the implicit situation calculus
assumption that the agent remembers all of the actions that have been performed (modulo
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observational indistinguishability). It is also obvious that from any global state (se, sa) we
have sufficient information to reconstruct the situation s that gave rise to it.
With this view of situations, the definition of do for the FHMV model is immediate.
If (se, sa) is the global state corresponding to situation s, then do(a, (se, sa)) is the new
global state (s′e, s′a), where s′e is the result of appending a to se , and s′a is the result of
appending a canonical member of {x : OI(a, x, s)} to sa . Similarly, there is an obvious
definition for K as well, which is the same as that taken in [14,35]: K((s′e, s′a), (se, sa))
holds precisely if s′a = sa , i.e., the agent has the same local state. Notice that this makes
K an equivalence relation, that is, reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Finally, we can
model p by defining p((s′e, s′a), (se, sa)) to be equal to p(s′, s) where s′ is the situation
corresponding to the global state (s′e, s′a). By normalizing summations over p we obtain a
distribution that defines the agent’s probabilistic beliefs when it is in global state (se, sa).
Besides helping to clarify our approach to modeling the agent’s epistemic state, the
discussion above also shows that the situation calculus is not fundamental. We could have
taken essentially the same approach using a modal logic (the FHMV model is formalized
in terms of modal logic) instead.
7.3. Bayesian conditioning
A standard model for belief update in the light of noisy information is Bayesian
conditioning [29]. The Bayesian model assumes two pieces of probabilistic information: a
prior distribution Pr(t) on the value t being sensed, and a conditional distribution Pr(x|t)
that gives the probability of sensing x given that the true value is t . Furthermore, the
standard model requires the assumption that the value read from the sensor is dependent
only on the true value, and is thus independent of other factors given this value.
Bayes’ Rule is now applied to obtain a posterior probability Pr(t|x) over the values of t ,
given that the sensor read the value x: Pr(t|x)= Pr(x|t)Pr(t)/Pr(x). The denominator—
the prior probability of reading the value x—is the only unknown expression, but it can
be easily computed. Since
∑
t ′ Pr(t ′|x) = 1, we must take Pr(x) to be the normalizing
factor
∑
t ′ Pr(x|t ′)Pr(t ′). Since this normalizing factor is independent of t , we see that the
key factor in determining the posterior probabilities is the numerator Pr(x|t)Pr(t), which
describes the relative probability of different values of t given the observation x .
Two significant assumptions are typically made when applying Bayesian conditioning.
The first is that the world does not change while the observation is being made, and the
second is that conditioning on a value (like x above) is the same as conditioning on the
event of observing x .
However, in our formalism it is quite possible to define actions that change the world
in the course of making an observation. For such actions, conditioning the agent’s beliefs
only on the value sensed (as is done above) does not adequately describe the agent’s new
belief state. It is necessary to also take into account the effect of the other changes caused
by the action (this is the so-called “total evidence” requirement of Bayesian conditioning).
In our formalism the agent’s new beliefs (as described by the updated p) is in fact affected
by both the sensed value and any other changes caused by an action.
To understand the second assumption, imagine that there are two fluents, Light-On and
Book, where Light-On(s) holds if the light is on in situation s and Book(s) holds if there
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is a book in the room. Initially, say that the agent considers the four possible situations
characterized by these two fluents as equally likely. Suppose the agent does a sensing
action that detects whether or not the book is in the room, but only if the light is on; when
the light is off nothing can be determined. If the sensing action does in fact detect the book,
then the agent should ascribe probability 1 to the light being on. However, this is not the
probability obtained by simply conditioning the initial uniform distribution on Book. The
probability that the light is on given that the book is in the room is 1/2, but the probability
that the light is on given that the book was observed to be in the room is 1. The naive
application of Bayes’ rule implicitly assumes that conditioning on the book being in the
room is equivalent to conditioning observing the book. 15
In such examples, we are dealing with a sensing action that is dependent on more than
just the value (or truth) of the fluent being sensed. It depends on other features of the
situation as well. As demonstrated in Example 5.1, our formalism can model context-
dependent sensing actions, and the agent’s new beliefs will reflect both the values sensed
as well as what can be learned about the context from that value. In this case, sensing the
value true for the fluent Book also allows us to learn that Light-On is true.
Our formalism does not force us to make these two assumptions, but when we do our
approach updates beliefs in a manner identical to standard Bayesian conditioning. We
demonstrate this in the next section.
7.3.1. Noisy sensors
To see how our formalism works, suppose the agent can perform a noisy sensing action
noisy-sense-f to sense the functional fluent f . This action is the nondeterministic union of
the primitive actions sense-f(x, y), which denotes that x is sensed, but the true value of f
is y . As we would expect, the precondition for the primitive action is
POSS(sense-f(x, y), s)≡ y = f (s);
the action sense-f(x, y) is possible in situation s exactly if f (s)= y . We assume that the
likelihood of these actions is otherwise independent of s, being dependent only on the
actual value of f (which is equal to y by the above precondition) and the value sensed:
`(sense-f(x, y), s)= `(sense-f(x, y)).
Note that this assumption is satisfied if we assume that the likelihood is a linear Gaussian
function of x − y , as discussed in Section 5. We take noisy-sense-f(x) to denote the
complex action of observing x on the sensor; thus,
noisy-sense-f(x) def= piy. sense-f(x, y).
15 We remark that a very similar phenomenon can be seen in the 3-prisoner puzzle. (See [29] for a discussion.)
Originally, each of prisoners a, b, and c is equally likely to be hung. Thus, prisoner a consider his probability of
being hung to be 1/3. Since at least one other prisoner will not be hung, the jailer agrees to give a the name of
one prisoner other than himself who will not be hung. When the jailer says c, naive conditioning would suggest
that a’s probability of being hung should be 1/2 since, after all, a knows that either he or b will be hung. Here
conditioning on the fact that c will not be hung is different from conditioning on the fact that the jailer—who is
following certain rules—said that c will be hung.
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We now want to make sure that the assumptions underlying Bayesian updating hold. To
capture the first assumption, that the world does not change while the observation is being
made, we simply ensure that sense-f(x, y) does not affect any other fluent besides K and
p. In particular, we ensure that the action does not appear in a successor-state axiom for
any other fluent.
That the second assumption holds is almost immediate: the value x returned by the
sensing action is influenced only by the true value of f .
Now we derive a characterization of the agent’s beliefs after reading the value x from
the sensor. Suppose that s+ is a possible successor state after reading the sensor, i.e.,
Do(noisy-sense-f(x), s, s+) holds, so that s+ is the result of executing sense-f(x, y) in
situation s, for some y and a fixed value of x . From the precondition of sense-f(x, y), we
see that we must have y = f (s), so there is actually only one possible successor state; that
is,
s+ = do(sense-f(x, f (s)), s).
Since sense-f does not affect f , we also have f (s+)= f (s).
From p’s successor-state axiom (Definition 5.3), we have that p(s′+, s+) can be nonzero
only for situations s′+ that are the result of executing an observationally indistinguishable
action whose preconditions are satisfied in a state s′. From the axioms for sense-f, we see
that all such situations with nonzero weight must be of the form
s′+ = do(sense-f(x, f (s′)), s′),
so p(s′+, s+)= p(s′, s)`(sense-f(x, f (s′)), s′) for some s′, and f (s′+)= f (s′).
Since BEL is an abbreviation for summations over p (Definition 5.1), we obtain
Do(noisy-sense-f(x), s, s+)⊃
BEL(f (snow)= t, s+)
=
∑
{s ′+: f (s ′+)=t}
p(s′+, s+)
/∑
s ′+
p(s′+, s+)
=
∑
{s ′: f (s ′)=t}
p(s′, s)`(sense-f(x, f (s′)), s′)
/∑
s ′
p(s′, s)`(sense-f(x, f (s′)), s′).
It is not hard to show that the numerator of this last expression is the (unnormalized) belief
that the true value is t and x is observed (which is the product of the prior belief that t
is the case and the conditional probability of observing x given t), while the denominator
is the (unnormalized) belief that x will be observed. Thus, this computation simulates
the Bayesian computation. This comes out even more clearly if we take advantage of
our assumption that the likelihood is independent of s. With this assumption, the term
`(sense-f(x, f (s′)), s′) is constant over the summation in the numerator. By dividing both
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numerator and denominator by
∑
s ′ p(s
′, s), we can convert the sums over p into an
expression involving BEL:
Do(noisy-sense-f(x), s, s+)⊃
BEL(f (snow)= t, s+)= BEL(f (snow)= t, s)`(sense-f(x, t))∑
t ′
BEL(f (snow)= t ′, s)`(sense-f(x, t ′)).
(17)
So we see that the belief that the value of f is t after doing a sensing action is the product
of the belief that the value of f was t before doing the sensing action and the conditional
probability of reading the value x given that the true value is t , divided by a normalizing
factor. Furthermore, if we examine the denominator, we see that it can be interpreted as the
agent’s prior belief that it would read the value x from its sensor. Again, our calculation is
identical to the standard Bayesian calculation.
7.3.2. Noisy effectors
Noisy effectors modify the agent’s beliefs in a similar manner. The key difference here
is that these actions also change the world, so the agent’s updated beliefs must reflect those
changes.
Suppose that we have an action change-f(x, y) that can be used to modify the current
value of the fluent f . Let its precondition be
POSS(change-f(x, y), s)≡ TRUE
(indicating that the action is always executable 16 ), its likelihood function be
`(change-f(x, y), s)= `(change-f(x, y))
(indicating that the likelihood is not dependent on the situation), and its corresponding non-
deterministic action (denoting that the effector was actuated with the nominal value x) be
noisy-change-f(x) def= piy. change-f(x, y).
Furthermore, suppose that the only effect of change-f is to modify the fluent f (and
suppose that it is the only action that does so). This is reflected in f ’s successor-state
axiom, which is
POSS(a, s)⊃ f (do(a, s))=
if ∃x, y. a = change-f(x, y)
then f (s)+ y
else f (s).
Suppose that the agent attempts to increment the fluent f by executing the action
noisy-change-f(x). From the precondition we can see that there are many different
situations s+ such that Do(noisy-change-f(x), s, s+) (unlike the case above for noisy
sensors, where there was a unique successor situation). Each of these situations is the result
of executing change-f(x, y), for some y , in situation s. That change-f changes the world is
16 This is similar to (9), the precondition to advance, except that we are not asserting any absolute error bound.
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captured by the fact that for each of these successor situations s+ = do(change-f(x, y), s),
we have f (s+)= f (s)+ y .
As in our derivation for noisy sensors, we have
Do(noisy-change-f(x), s, s+)⊃
BEL(f (snow)= t, s+)
=
∑
{s ′+: f (s ′+)=t}
p(s′+, s+)
/∑
s ′+
p(s′+, s+)
=
∑
y
∑
{s ′+: f (s ′+)=t∧s ′+=do(change-f(x,y),s ′)}
p(s′+, s+)
/∑
s ′+
p(s′+, s+)
=
∑
y
∑
{s ′: f (s ′)=t−y}
p(s′, s)`(change-f(x, y), s′)
/∑
y
∑
s ′
p(s′, s)`(change-f(x, y), s′)
=
∑
y
`(change-f(x, y))
∑
{s ′: f (s ′)=t−y}
p(s′, s)
/∑
y
`(change-f(x, y))
∑
s ′
p(s′, s).
Now dividing top and bottom by
∑′
s p(s
′, s) to convert to beliefs, and simplifying, using
the observation that
∑
y `(change-f(x, y)) is 1, we obtain
Do(noisy-change-f(x), s, s+)⊃
BEL(f (snow)= t, s+)=
∑
y
`(change-f(x, y))BEL(f (snow)= t − y, s). (18)
There are two differences between this result and our previous result for noisy sensors.
First, we have a summation over y , the possible values that could have been generated by
the action. This summation arises from the fact that any situation prior to the action could
have given rise to a situation in which f = t : all that is required is that an action with the
appropriate effect on f be executed. In the noisy-sensor case, the actual value of the fluent
is not changed, so we need to consider only the prior situations in which the fluent has the
same value. Second, it seems that there is no normalizing constant in this case. However,
the normalizing constant is present and equal to∑
t ′
∑
y
`(change-f(x, y))BEL(f (snow)= t ′ − y, s).
It turns out that this sum is always equal to 1.
There is another way of deriving this result. Consider the agent’s beliefs about the
value of the fluent f prior to executing change-f. The fluent f can be viewed as being
a random variable, with the probability that it takes on any particular value t equal to
BEL(f (snow) = t, s). When the action noisy-change-f(x) is executed, the value y that
it adds to f is also a random variable with distribution `(change-f(x, y)). Hence, the
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new value of f after executing noisy-change-f(x) is the sum of two independent random
variables, the old value of f and the amount added y . A standard result from probability
theory is that the distribution of the sum of two independent random variables is the
convolution of their distributions. Our result above shows that the agent’s new beliefs about
f are in fact the convolution of its prior beliefs and the distribution on the amount by which
f can change.
7.4. Examples
It is convenient to be able to talk about what happens to the agent’s beliefs and
knowledge after reading some particular sequence of values from its sensors. To do this,
we introduce a parameterized version of noisy-sense-position:
noisy-sense-position(x) def= piy. sense-position(x, y), (19)
where only the value y is chosen (by the value of position in the situation). Intuitively,
noisy-sense-position(x) is the “action” where the agent activates its sensor and then
observes that the value x has been returned. This action is not actually executable by
the agent, since it cannot choose to execute a noisy-sense-position(3.0) over, say, a
noisy-sense-position(2.8). Nevertheless, we can write Do(noisy-sense-position(3.0), s,
s+), which asserts that the agent has executed a noisy-sense-position and read the value
3.0 from its sensor, ending up in s+.
Example 7.1. Suppose that the agent is sensing its position position using noisy-sense-
position actions. For the purposes of this example, let the action-likelihood axiom for
sense-position be
`(sense-position(x, y), s)= if x = y
then 0.5
else if |x − y| = 1
then 0.25
else 0
Here we are assuming that position and the arguments to sense-position can take on only
integer values (i.e., this is the precision of these numbers). The axiom specifies that there
is zero probability that the sensor will read a position that is greater than 1 unit away from
the true position, and that the sensor noise is independent of other features of the situation.
Let the agent’s initial beliefs regarding position be given by BEL(position(snow) =
t, S0)= 1/8, for t ∈ {8,9,11,12}, and BEL(position(snow) = 10, S0) = 1/2. Initially, the
agent does not ascribe positive probability to any other possible value for position. This
distribution of beliefs for the various values of position in S0 is shown in Fig. 1.
Suppose that the agent senses its position and observes the value 11. If S1 is a
possible successor situation, so that Do(noisy-sense-position(11), S0, S1) holds, a simple
calculation using (17) shows how the agent’s beliefs change: BEL(position(snow) =
10, S1) = 4/7, BEL(position(snow) = 11, S1) = 2/7, and BEL(position(snow) = 12, S1) =
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Fig. 1. Sensing with exact motion.
1/7. The new distribution is also shown in Fig. 1. Since, with probability 1, the sensor
returns a value that is within 1 unit of the true value, the agent now has degree of belief
zero in the values 8 and 9.
Note that Fig. 1 shows that the agent still that the most likely value of position is 10,
even though its sensor returned the value 11. This arises from the agent’s high prior belief
in the value being 10.
We have not specified an absolute error bound for sense-position, i.e., a value for c in
(12), implicitly assuming it to be greater than 1. If, for example, we were to specify that the
agent knows that the sensor cannot return an error of greater than 2, i.e., if we set c= 2 in
the precondition axiom, then we will have that the agent knows that position 6= 8. However,
the agent will not know that position 6= 9, even though it still has zero degree of belief in
this value. Our framework distinguishes between full belief and knowledge in this case.
Sequences of sensor readings of the same fluent, including sequences of readings from
different sensors, are also handled correctly in our framework. Such sequences correspond
to sequences of sensing actions, and thus are handled by a simple iteration of (17), given
that the sensors satisfy the assumptions of that equation. In particular, if the sensor action
likelihood function is dependent only on the actual value being sensed, then each sensor
reading will be independent of all previous readings. 17 As a result, after a sequence of
sensing actions, the agent will come to have either greater certainty or greater uncertainty
about the value of the sensed fluent, depending on whether or not the sequence of readings
agree.
17 A situation is a world history consisting of the sequence of actions executed (Section 2). Hence, one can easily
write a sensor-likelihood axiom that did display a dependency on previous readings, if, for example, one wanted
to capture the properties of a sensor that displayed some form of hysteresis.
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Example 7.2. Suppose that the agent executes another noisy-sense-position action in
the situation S1. Further, suppose that the agent observes the same value as before 11,
and let S2 be such that Do(noisy-sense-position(11), S1, S2). Then, another application
of (17) (applied to the agent’s beliefs in S1), yields the belief distribution shown in
Fig. 1: BEL(position(snow) = 10, S2) = 4/9, BEL(position(snow) = 11, S2) = 4/9, and
BEL(position(snow) = 12, S2) = 1/9. The agent’s beliefs have converged more tightly
around the value 11, since it has now sensed that value twice.
The most important part of our formalism is the natural manner in which effectors and
sensors interact in their effects on the agent’s beliefs. For simplicity, first we examine
the case where the agent has exact control over a fluent, but can sense its value only
approximately. Then we examine the case of a noisy sensor interleaved with a noisy
effector.
Example 7.3. Suppose that instead of the noisy effector noisy-advance, the agent has
an exact effector action exact-advance that has no preconditions, and affects position
as specified in (6). Note that exact-advance is an ordinary deterministic action, so it is
observationally indistinguishable only from itself, and it has a unit likelihood function:
`(exact-advance(x), s)= 1.
Let the agent move exactly 2 units backwards when it is in situation S2. Call the new
situation
S3 = do(exact-advance(−2), S2).
Then, the successor-state axiom for p and position imply that the agent’s beliefs are
precisely shifted to worlds in which it has moved backward 2 units: we have a simple
transfer of probability mass from each situation to its successor situation in which the
agent has moved backward 2 units.
Deterministic actions like this modify the agent’s beliefs in a manner that is related
to Lewis’s notion of imaging [22]. In imaging, beliefs are updated by transferring all
probability mass to the “closest” world, rather than by renormalizing the mass after
removing some worlds as when we condition. Here, every situation transfers its probability
mass to its successor. Different things are true in these successor situations, as the action
has effected various changes. This means that the agent will believe different things in
the successor situation. Nevertheless, since all of these successor situations arise from the
execution of the same action, the changes to the agent’s beliefs are generally systematic.
In particular, in the absence of ramifications, it will change its beliefs only about fluents
affected by the action.
In this example, we have that
BEL(position(snow)= t, S3)= BEL(position(snow)= t + 2, S2)
for all t . The agent’s shifted beliefs are shown in Fig. 1. This is exactly how one would
expect the agent’s beliefs to change in response to an exact movement like this.
Example 7.4. Suppose that the agent again executes a noisy-sense-position action in
S3 and observes the value 9. Let S4 be such that Do(noisy-sense-position(9), S3, S4).
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A reading of 9 is consistent with the previous readings of 11, since the agent has moved
back 2 units. Hence, as shown in Fig. 1, it results in a further tightening of the agent’s
beliefs, around the value 9. If the agent subsequently moves forward 2 units, executing an
exact-advance(2) action, so that
S5 = do(exact-advance(2), S4),
its beliefs will then be clustered around 11, as shown in the figure: BEL(position(snow)=
10, S5) = 4/13, BEL(position(snow) = 11, S5) = 8/13, and BEL(position(snow)= 12, S5)
= 1/13.
Intuitively, since the agent’s exact-advance action incurs no error, we would expect that
if the agent had sensed the value 11 in situation S2, then its beliefs about the distance to
the wall should not change after moving forwards and backwards an equal distance. Our
model respects this intuition. In particular, the agent’s beliefs in S5 are identical to what
they would be if it had executed an noisy-sense-position(11) in S2, as indicated in the
figure by the diagonal arrow from S2 to S5.
Example 7.5. Now we examine the case of a noisy effector. Let us return to the effector
noisy-advance, taking (7) to specify the successor-state axioms for position. Suppose that
the likelihood axiom for advance is
`(advance(x, y), s)= if x = y
then 0.5
else-if |x − y| = 1
then 0.25
else 0
Here, with probability 1, the difference between the agent’s actual move and the move
specified is no more than one unit.
Starting at situation S5, with beliefs about position as given above, suppose that S6 is a
successor state of an attempt to move forward 1 unit, so that Do(noisy-advance(1), S5, S6)
holds. The likelihood axiom above indicates that in this case the probability the
agent moves forward 2 units is 1/4, 1 unit is 1/2, and 0 units is 1/4. Eq. (18)
can be used to calculate the agent’s new beliefs about its position. In particular, we
obtain BEL(position(snow) = 10, S6) = 4/52, BEL(position(snow) = 11, S6) = 16/52,
BEL(position(snow) = 12, S6) = 21/52, BEL(position(snow) = 13, S6) = 10/52, and BEL
(position(snow)= 14, S6)= 1/52. This distribution is shown in Fig. 2.
Suppose that the agent now attempts to move back to its previous position by executing a
noisy-advance(−1). If situation S7 is such that Do(noisy-advance(−1), S6, S7) holds, then
the agent’s beliefs in S7 are BEL(position(snow) = 8, S7) = 1/52, BEL(position(snow) =
9, S7)= 6/52, BEL(position(snow)= 10, S7)= 14.25/52, BEL(position(snow)= 11, S7)=
17/52, BEL(position(snow) = 12, S7) = 10.5/52, BEL(position(snow) = 13, S7) = 3/52,
and BEL(position(snow)= 14, S7)= 0.25/52.
We see from this example that in the presence of noisy motion, the agent’s confidence
in its location degrades; its beliefs spread out. And this effect increases the more it
moves. Unless it wants to lose its way completely, it must resort to sensing. Fig. 2
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Fig. 2. Noisy motion.
shows what happens to the agent’s beliefs after it senses its position to be 11 in
situation S7. If S8 is such that Do(noisy-sense-position(11), S7, S8) holds, then the
agent’s new beliefs in S8 are BEL(position(snow) = 8, S8) = 0, BEL(position(snow) =
9, S8) = 0, BEL(position(snow) = 10, S8) = 57/235, BEL(position(snow) = 11, S8) =
136/235, BEL(position(snow)= 12, S8)= 42/235, BEL(position(snow)= 13, S8)= 0, and
BEL(position(snow) = 14, S8) = 0. Thus, the beliefs are considerably sharpened by the
sensing operation.
The previous examples have employed discrete beliefs and likelihood functions,
which make the computations more apparent. More practical models are also easily
accommodated, and in fact sometimes yield simpler, albeit less obvious, computations.
In robotics applications one of the most popular models of noisy sensors and effectors
is the linear Gaussian model where the nominal value is the actual value plus a Gaussian
noise factor (see, e.g., the various papers in [7]). Eqs. (15) and (16) are examples of linear
Gaussian models. The next example shows how easy belief update is with such models.
Example 7.6. Suppose that the agent has an action noisy-change-f for effecting changes to
a fluent f , and an action noisy-sense-f for sensing its value, as in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
Further, suppose that the likelihood functions for both change-f and sense-f are linear
Gaussian, so that
`(change-f(x, y), s)= Normal((y − x)/σe),
and
`(sense-f(x, y), s)= Normal((y − x)/σs).
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Suppose that the agent’s initial beliefs about a fluent f are described by the normal
distribution N(µ0, σ 20 ) with mean µ and variance σ
2
0 . That is,
BEL(f (snow)= t, S0)= Normal((t −µ0)/σ0),
where Normal(z) is the standardized normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.
Now suppose that a noisy-change-f(x1) action is executed. Eq. (18) shows that the
agent’s new belief about f is that its value is the result of adding two independent random
variables (which gives rise to the convolution of two distributions). In particular, the new
value for the fluent f is the sum of the change actually generated by the action and f ’s
previous value. The likelihood axiom for change-f(x1, y) indicates that y , the change to
f generated by the action, is a normally distributed random variable with mean x1 and
variance σ 2e . The agent’s initial beliefs indicate that f ’s previous value is also a normally
distributed random variable with mean µ0 and variance σ 20 .
A well known (and easy-to-derive) result is that the sum of two normally distributed
random variables is also normally distributed (e.g., see [25, p. 146]). In particular, we have
that, after executing the action, the agent’s new beliefs about f are described by another
normal distribution with mean µ1 = µ0 + x1 and variance σ 21 = σ 20 + σ 2e .
Next, suppose that the agent executes a sensing action and reads the value z1 from its
sensor, i.e., the action noisy-sense-f(z1) is executed. Eq. (17) indicates that the agent’s
new beliefs about the value of f are the normalized result of multiplying its prior beliefs
by the probability of observing z1 given the value of f . Both of these quantities are
again described by normal distributions. The prior beliefs are normally distributed, and
for each value of f , the probability of z1 is also normally distributed, according to the
likelihood function above. In this case, another well-known result is that the posterior
beliefs about f remain normally distributed (see, e.g., [26, p. 2]). In particular, we have
that the agent’s new beliefs about f are that its value is normally distributed with mean
µ2 = (z1σ 21 +µ1σ 2s )/(σ 2s + σ s1 ) and variance σ 22 = σ 21 σ 2s /(σ 21 + σ 2s ).
It is easy to see that these equations can be applied iteratively to keep track of the agent’s
beliefs about a fluent’s value given a sequence of modification to and sensing of this value.
With a normal distribution we need keep track only of the current mean and variance to
completely describe the agent’s beliefs.
The fact that a normal distribution is preserved under these types of updates, with easy-
to-compute modifications to its parameters, forms the basis of the popular technique of
Kalman filtering [6]. In fact, this example is simply an instance of Kalman filtering, and
it can be generalized within our framework to handle the situation where the fluent being
modified and sensed is vector-valued. In this case the above variances would be replaced by
covariance matrices, and the computations to update the mean and variance would become
matrix manipulations.
All of the previous examples involved the sensing or affecting of a numeric fluent. Our
final example demonstrates that the formalism can also be used to model noisy actions that
affect non-numeric fluents.
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Example 7.7. In Section 2 we used the example of dropping fragile objects. However,
when a fragile object is dropped it does not always break, it breaks with some probability.
We an model this situation quite easily in our formalism.
Suppose that there are two primitive drop actions, drop-break and drop-not-break,
characterized by the following axioms:
POSS(drop-break(x), s)≡Holding(x, s)∧ Fragile(x, s)
POSS(drop-not-break(x), s)≡Holding(x, s)
OI(drop-break(x), a′, s)≡ a′ = drop-break(x)∨ a′ = drop-not-break(x)
OI(drop-not-break(x), a′, s)≡ a′ = drop-not-break(x)∨ a′ = drop-break(x)
`(drop-break(x), s)= if Fragile(x) then 0.8 else 0
`(drop-not-break(x), s)= if Fragile(x) then 0.2 else 1.
Let the successor-state axiom for Broken be
POSS(a, s)⊃ Broken(x,do(a, s))≡ a = drop-break(x)∨ Broken(x, s).
Finally, suppose that the agent can execute a nondeterministic action drop:
drop(x) def= drop-break(x)|drop-not-break(x).
These axioms specify that the actions drop-break and drop-not-break cannot be
distinguished by the agent. That is, the agent can execute a drop action, but does not know
ahead of time whether or not dropping an object will cause it to be broken. If the object is
not fragile only the drop-not-break action can be executed, in which case it has probability 1
of being executed. On the other hand, if the object is fragile, then the preconditions of both
drop-not-break and drop-break are satisfied and either can be executed. The probability
of drop-break being executed, i.e., the probability that a fragile object will break when
dropped, is 0.8, while drop-not-break has probability 0.2. The successor-state axiom for
break specifies that drop-break does in fact cause an object to become broken.
If the agent executes drop(x) in situation s for some object x given that KNOW(holding
(x), s) (so that the action is possible), then we obtain for any successor situation s+
Do(drop(A), s, s+)∧KNOW(holding(x), s)
⊃ BEL(Broken(x, snow), s+)= 0.8× BEL(Fragile(x, snow), s).
For example, if the agent’s degree of belief is 0.5 that the object being dropped is fragile,
then the agent will have degree of belief degree 0.4 that the object will be broken after being
dropped. Similarly, if the agent is certain that the object is fragile, then it will have degree
of belief 0.8 that the object will break after being dropped. This makes sense intuitively, as
the object can be broken only by dropping if it was originally fragile, and even then there
is a probability of only 0.8 that it will be broken by the drop action.
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8. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that noisy perception and actions can be modeled in the situation
calculus by a simple extension of previous work. In particular, from the successor-
state axiom for p, (5.3), and a constraint on its values in S0, (14), we obtain as
consequences what many have argued to be the natural models for belief update from
perception (Bayesian conditioning) and from actions (a form of Lewis’s imaging) [30].
Most importantly, our formalism succeeds in capturing some key features of the interaction
between these two models for belief change.
Poole [33] has recently proposed a formalism that addresses similar issues and also uses
the situation calculus. His proposal is based on an acyclic logic program that specifies a
theory of the situation calculus and a set of “choices”. Each choice (total choice in his
notation), when conjoined with the logic program, produces a single first-order model
of the situation calculus. In such a model, everything is deterministic, i.e., actions have
unique outcomes, and everything is known, i.e., all sentences are either true or false.
By placing a probability distribution over the set of choices we obtain a distribution
over the set of models. The probability of various conditions (e.g., outcomes of specific
action sequences) can then be evaluated by measuring the probability of the set of models
satisfying that condition. Thus Poole is using a model checking approach where there is
a fixed probability distribution over a specific set of possible worlds. In our formalism,
on the other hand, we simply place logical constraints on the probability distribution; our
logical theories will be satisfied by many different probability distributions. In order to
obtain a succinct representation of the distribution of the set of choices, Poole must impose
strong assumptions of independence. Our approach offers generality in terms of the range
of distributions that can be modeled. On the other hand, partly because of the succinct
representation he is able to use, Poole’s approach offers computational advantages: model
checking is often simpler than logical reasoning. Another key difference in our approaches
is that Poole does not have a model of the agent’s beliefs; his probabilities are best viewed
as probabilities of events assigned by some external source. Our approach provides an
explicit model of the agent’s epistemic state.
Much of our approach can be exported to alternate formalisms. For example, instead of
the situation calculus, a modal logic could be used as a starting point, assuming some
solution to the frame problem, as in [5]. Another possibility is to take another action
formalism like the fluent calculus [2,3] which already deals in some form with both the
frame problem and indeterminate actions, and extend it to include fluents for knowledge,
sensing actions, and graded belief as we have done here. Similarly, the probabilistic
component could be replaced with an alternate formalism, like Dempster–Shafer belief
functions [38] or possibility measures [8]. All that would be required is to replace the
functional fluent p and axioms for BEL with fluents and axioms to support an alternate
measure of belief. The likelihood functions could then be replaced with nonprobabilistic
functions to support an alternate rule of belief update.
As for future work, apart from addressing limitations of the formalism, there is its
application to high-level agent control. In the GOLOG work mentioned in the introduction,
the ability of an agent to execute a program depends on what it knows about the truth
value of the test conditions in that program. Program execution can also be affected by the
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agent’s beliefs. In particular, the agent might choose to execute different actions dependent
on its degree of belief in various conditions. For example, it might choose the action that it
believes has the highest probability of yielding a desirable outcome.
The key issue will then be characterizing the program’s effects. For example, one
could construct programs that with probability bounded below by 1− ε achieve a certain
condition. 18 Or one could employ a richer model that included an assignment of utilities
to situations, and attempt to construct programs that maximize the agent’s expected utility.
Appendix A. Formalization of belief
In this appendix, we show how BEL can be formalized so as to ensure that it is in fact a
probability distribution.
As mentioned in Section 2, we treat the situation calculus as a many-sorted dialect of the
predicate calculus with some second-order features. Included among the sorts are situations
and real numbers. For convenience, we also assume that the language includes the natural
numbers as a sub-sort of the reals. 19 In particular, in the language we have variables that
range only over these specific sorts. 20
With sorted variables we can then formalize the summations used in our definition of
BEL (Definition 5.1). Let φ(snow) be a formula over the special situation term snow, r and
r ′ be variables of sort real, f and g be second-order function variables (ranging over all
functions), andm, i , and j be variables of sort natural number. We define sump(φ(snow), s)
to be the summation of p in s over all situations s′ satisfying φ(snow/s′):
sump(φ(snow), s)= r def=
∀r ′.(r ′ < r)≡
∃f,g,m.
∀i, j.(i 6= j ⊃ g(i) 6= g(j))∧ (i 6m⊃ φ(snow/g(i)))
∧ f (0)= 0
∧ ∀i.f (i + 1)= f (i)+ p(g(i), s)
∧ f (m) > r ′
Basically, this formula says that sump(φ(snow), s) is equal to r iff for every value r ′, r ′
is less than r iff there exists a finite set m of situations (enumerated by the function g(0),
. . . , g(m)) satisfying φ whose p values sum to a value (computed by the function f )
greater than r ′. Note that this definition entails that an infinite set of situations has a p sum
that is the limit of the sum of p over its elements. In particular, the resulting probability
distribution (achieved once we normalize the sum) will be a discrete distribution.
18 Work on planning has addressed constructing simple versions of such programs (those representable as
conditional plans) satisfying these criteria, e.g., [17].
19 As is well known, with 0, 1, and + in the language, we can actually define the natural numbers, since we have
second-order quantification, as follows: n ∈ N is an abbreviation for ∀P ((0 ∈ P ∧ ∀y(y ∈ P ⊃ y + 1 ∈ P )) ⊃
n ∈ P ).
20 Note that we can easily do without such variables by including some unary “type” predicates in our language.
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Now we can formally define BEL(φ(snow), s) as
BEL(φ(snow), s)= sump(φ(snow), s)
/
sump(TRUE, s),
where TRUE is satisfied by all situations.
In Section 5 we imposed the following constraints on p:
∀s.(p(s, S0)> 0)∧ (¬K(s,S0)⊃ p(s, S0)= 0).
Now we can add the additional constraint:
∃r.r > 0∧ sump(TRUE, S0)= r,
where r is a variable of sort real. This constraint ensures that the sum of p over all
situations is, in S0, a finite positive number. From these constraints it follows, that for every
formula φ, sump(φ(snow), S0) exists and, since p is nonnegative, is less than (or equal to)
sump(φ(snow), S0). It is then immediate that in S0, BEL is a probability distribution over
the space of situations. Finally, the constraint ¬K(s,S0)⊃ p(s, S0)= 0 entails that all that
is known is assigned degree of belief 1.
What about BEL in situations other than S0? By identical reasoning, in any situation
s, BEL will be a probability distribution over the set of situations if the sum of p over
all situations is, in s, a finite positive number and p is nonnegative. To guarantee this
we require that the action-likelihood functions (Definition 5.2) be probability distributions
over the set of actions.
First we define sum`(φ(anow, s), s) to be the sum of `(anow, s) over all actions anow that
satisfy the formula φ(anow, s) in situation s. This can be defined in an identical manner to
sump , the only change required is to sum the values of `(g(i), s) instead of the values of
p(g(i), s) in the formula above. We then impose the following constraints:
(1) ∀a, s.`(a, s)> 0.
(2) ∀a, s.sum`(OI(a, anow, s), s)= 1.
The first formula says the action-likelihood function is nonnegative, while the second
formula ensures that for every action a the sum of the likelihood function over all actions
anow that are observationally indistinguishable to a in situation s is one. Together these two
formulas make the action-likelihood function a discrete probability distribution over each
set of observationally indistinguishable actions.
With this in hand, the successor-state axiom for p (Definition 5.3) gives us what
we require. Given that sump(TRUE, s) is finite the axiom shows that for any action a,
sump(TRUE,do(a, s)) remains finite since in the term p(s′, s) × `(a′, s′), `(a′, s′) has
a finite sum over the a′. Since sump(TRUE, S0) is finite, we obtain by induction that it
remains finite for every situation (since all situations arise from applying a finite sequence
of actions to S0). Finally, the successor-state axiom for K (Definition 4.2) shows that only
K-related situations get positive values of p. Hence in every situation, not just S0, all that
is known is assigned degree of belief 1.
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